The Monday confrontation between Zelensky and the 'old guard trio' of Merkel, Macron, and Putin, has come and gone, and we are now left with trying to read the 'tea leaves' that has been left behind.
According to Roman Olearchyk and Henry Foy,
"Speaking to the press in the Elysée Palace alongside Mr Macron, German chancellor Angela Merkel and the Russian president, a tired-looking Mr Zelensky said he missed his home country after hours of negotiations that did not yield any major breakthrough. Yet, the Ukrainian leader stood firm.
...
Ukraine would not accept Russia’s annexation of the Crimea peninsula in 2014, he insisted. Kyiv would reject Moscow’s push for federalisation of the country or permanent autonomy for the breakaway eastern Donbas regions, where Russia-backed separatists are fighting government forces, he added.
“Ukraine is an independent, democratic state, whose development vector will always be chosen exclusively by the people of Ukraine,” he said. “Both Donbas and Crimea are Ukraine.” (Financial Times : 10 December, 2019) (my emphasis)
Zelensky has swum against a formidable political tide, and even though an agreement about the exchange of prisoners has been reached, John Irish and, Margaryta Chornokondratenko (left) report that,
"Asked who triumphed in their exchanges, Zelenskiy said: “I don’t know who (beat) who. I think it would be appropriate to be diplomatic as we’ve just started talking. Let’s say for now it’s a draw.” (Reuters : 9 December, 2019) (my emphasis)
To the relief of Zelensky, Roman Olearchyk and Henry Foy further report that,
“There was neither betrayal, nor a victory, neither a peace agreement signed, nor capitulation,” said Iryna Herashchenko, an MP allied with former Ukrainian president Mr Poroshenko. “And at this stage this is probably good for Ukraine.” (ibid Olearchyk and Foy) (my emphasis)
Putin, however,
"... expressed only cautious hope for the peace talks. “All this gives us the grounds to suppose that the process is developing in the right direction,” he said.
Sticking to his cool tone, when he ended his remarks to journalists in Paris, Putin thanked Merkel and Macron warmly but offered no pleasantries to Zelenskiy." (ibid John Iris and, Margaryta Chornokondratenko)
This behaviour of Putin towards Zelensky may be due to the fact that EU and US sanctions against Putin and his 'siloviki' remain firmly in place.
It also signifies that Putin blundered when he publicly stated that,
"The Minsk [II] agreements, the blueprint for peace struck in 2014 and 2015 between Mr Putin and Mr Zelensky’s predecessor Petro Poroshenko, needed to be implemented “in full”, Mr Putin said in Paris. (ibid Olearchyk and Foy) (my emphasis)
It is therefore no wonder that,
"In one episode described in a statement by Arsen Avakov, Ukraine’s interior affairs minister, the Russian president’s adviser Vladislav Surkov lost his temper. “Mr Surkov lost his nerve, threw papers on the table and yelled: ‘we did not agree to this’,” according to Mr Avakov." (ibid Olearchyk and Foy) (my emphasis)
The Common Agreed Conclusions also state that, Merkel, Putin, Macron, and Zelensky have agreed to,
" ... have another meeting in this format within four months on the political and security conditions, inter alia for the organization of the local elections." (Eleysee Palace : 9 December 2019) (my emphasis)
Could this agreement by Putin have something to do with the fact that Zelensky has, in his possession, the complete transcript of his fateful call with Trump on the 25th July, a call that is now at the very epicentre of Trump's impending impeachment and which, if publicly released, will end Trump's presidency?
Both Putin and Trump are aware of this salient political fact.
Is this why that dyed-in-the-wool Soviet Foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, met with Trump on Monday in the Oval Office, the same day as the Normandy Format meeting was taking place in Paris?
It is ironical that both Zelensky and Putin have Trump's fate in their hands viz.
"I think it would be appropriate to be diplomatic as we’ve just started talking. Let’s say for now it’s a draw.” (ibid Olearchyk and Foy)) (my emphasis)
Paris "Normandie" summit - Common agreed conclusions
9 décembre 2019 - Déclaration
The President of the French Republic, the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, the President of the Russian Federation and the President of Ukraine met in Paris today.
The Minsk agreements (Minsk Protocol of 5 September 2014, Minsk Memorandum of 19 September 2014 and the Minsk Package of Measures of 12 February 2015) continue to be the basis of the work of the Normandy format whose member states are committed to their full implementation.
They underline their shared aspiration to a sustainable and comprehensive architecture of trust and security in Europe, based on the OSCE principles, for which the settlement of the conflict in Ukraine is one of several important steps.
On this basis, they decide on the following:
1. Immediate measures to stabilize the situation in the conflict area
The sides commit to a full and comprehensive implementation of the ceasefire, strengthened by the implementation of all necessary ceasefire support measures, before the end of the year 2019.
They will support the development and implementation of an updated demining plan, on the basis of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group on demining activities, dated March 3, 2016.
They will support an agreement within the Trilateral Contact Group on three additional disengagement areas, with the aim of disengaging forces and equipment by the end of March 2020.
They encourage the Trilateral Contact Group to facilitate the release and exchange of conflict-related detainees by the end of the year, based on the principle of “all for all”, starting with “all identified for all identified”, with the understanding that international organisations including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) be granted full and unconditional access to all detained persons.
They will support an agreement within the Trilateral Contact Group, within 30 days, on new crossing points along the line of contact, based primarily on humanitarian criteria.
They recall that the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) should be able to use all possibilities of the 21 March 2014 mandate, and have safe and secure access throughout Ukraine in order to fully implement its mandate.
2. Measures to implement the political provisions of the Minsk agreements
The sides express interest in agreeing within the Normandy format (N4) and the Trilateral Contact Group on all the legal aspects of the Special Order of Local Self-Government - special status - of Certain Areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions - as outlined in the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements from 2015 - in order to ensure its functioning on a permanent basis.
They consider it necessary to incorporate the “Steinmeier formula” into the Ukrainian legislation, in accordance with the version agreed upon within the N4 and the Trilateral Contact Group.
3. Follow up
They ask their Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Political Advisors to ensure the implementation of the agreements reached and they agree to have another meeting in this format within four months on the political and security conditions, inter alia for the organization of the local elections.
According to Roman Olearchyk and Henry Foy,
"Speaking to the press in the Elysée Palace alongside Mr Macron, German chancellor Angela Merkel and the Russian president, a tired-looking Mr Zelensky said he missed his home country after hours of negotiations that did not yield any major breakthrough. Yet, the Ukrainian leader stood firm.
...
Ukraine would not accept Russia’s annexation of the Crimea peninsula in 2014, he insisted. Kyiv would reject Moscow’s push for federalisation of the country or permanent autonomy for the breakaway eastern Donbas regions, where Russia-backed separatists are fighting government forces, he added.
“Ukraine is an independent, democratic state, whose development vector will always be chosen exclusively by the people of Ukraine,” he said. “Both Donbas and Crimea are Ukraine.” (Financial Times : 10 December, 2019) (my emphasis)
Zelensky has swum against a formidable political tide, and even though an agreement about the exchange of prisoners has been reached, John Irish and, Margaryta Chornokondratenko (left) report that,
"Asked who triumphed in their exchanges, Zelenskiy said: “I don’t know who (beat) who. I think it would be appropriate to be diplomatic as we’ve just started talking. Let’s say for now it’s a draw.” (Reuters : 9 December, 2019) (my emphasis)
To the relief of Zelensky, Roman Olearchyk and Henry Foy further report that,
“There was neither betrayal, nor a victory, neither a peace agreement signed, nor capitulation,” said Iryna Herashchenko, an MP allied with former Ukrainian president Mr Poroshenko. “And at this stage this is probably good for Ukraine.” (ibid Olearchyk and Foy) (my emphasis)
Putin, however,
"... expressed only cautious hope for the peace talks. “All this gives us the grounds to suppose that the process is developing in the right direction,” he said.
Sticking to his cool tone, when he ended his remarks to journalists in Paris, Putin thanked Merkel and Macron warmly but offered no pleasantries to Zelenskiy." (ibid John Iris and, Margaryta Chornokondratenko)
This behaviour of Putin towards Zelensky may be due to the fact that EU and US sanctions against Putin and his 'siloviki' remain firmly in place.
It also signifies that Putin blundered when he publicly stated that,
"The Minsk [II] agreements, the blueprint for peace struck in 2014 and 2015 between Mr Putin and Mr Zelensky’s predecessor Petro Poroshenko, needed to be implemented “in full”, Mr Putin said in Paris. (ibid Olearchyk and Foy) (my emphasis)
It is therefore no wonder that,
"In one episode described in a statement by Arsen Avakov, Ukraine’s interior affairs minister, the Russian president’s adviser Vladislav Surkov lost his temper. “Mr Surkov lost his nerve, threw papers on the table and yelled: ‘we did not agree to this’,” according to Mr Avakov." (ibid Olearchyk and Foy) (my emphasis)
The Common Agreed Conclusions also state that, Merkel, Putin, Macron, and Zelensky have agreed to,
" ... have another meeting in this format within four months on the political and security conditions, inter alia for the organization of the local elections." (Eleysee Palace : 9 December 2019) (my emphasis)
Could this agreement by Putin have something to do with the fact that Zelensky has, in his possession, the complete transcript of his fateful call with Trump on the 25th July, a call that is now at the very epicentre of Trump's impending impeachment and which, if publicly released, will end Trump's presidency?
Both Putin and Trump are aware of this salient political fact.
Is this why that dyed-in-the-wool Soviet Foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, met with Trump on Monday in the Oval Office, the same day as the Normandy Format meeting was taking place in Paris?
MSNBC : 10 December 2019
It is ironical that both Zelensky and Putin have Trump's fate in their hands viz.
- Putin's 'compromat' on Trump (cf the Steele Dossier), and
- Zelensky's 'complete 25 July transcript ' of that call he had with Trump'
"I think it would be appropriate to be diplomatic as we’ve just started talking. Let’s say for now it’s a draw.” (ibid Olearchyk and Foy)) (my emphasis)
Paris "Normandie" summit - Common agreed conclusions
9 décembre 2019 - Déclaration
The President of the French Republic, the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, the President of the Russian Federation and the President of Ukraine met in Paris today.
The Minsk agreements (Minsk Protocol of 5 September 2014, Minsk Memorandum of 19 September 2014 and the Minsk Package of Measures of 12 February 2015) continue to be the basis of the work of the Normandy format whose member states are committed to their full implementation.
They underline their shared aspiration to a sustainable and comprehensive architecture of trust and security in Europe, based on the OSCE principles, for which the settlement of the conflict in Ukraine is one of several important steps.
On this basis, they decide on the following:
1. Immediate measures to stabilize the situation in the conflict area
The sides commit to a full and comprehensive implementation of the ceasefire, strengthened by the implementation of all necessary ceasefire support measures, before the end of the year 2019.
They will support the development and implementation of an updated demining plan, on the basis of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group on demining activities, dated March 3, 2016.
They will support an agreement within the Trilateral Contact Group on three additional disengagement areas, with the aim of disengaging forces and equipment by the end of March 2020.
They encourage the Trilateral Contact Group to facilitate the release and exchange of conflict-related detainees by the end of the year, based on the principle of “all for all”, starting with “all identified for all identified”, with the understanding that international organisations including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) be granted full and unconditional access to all detained persons.
They will support an agreement within the Trilateral Contact Group, within 30 days, on new crossing points along the line of contact, based primarily on humanitarian criteria.
They recall that the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) should be able to use all possibilities of the 21 March 2014 mandate, and have safe and secure access throughout Ukraine in order to fully implement its mandate.
2. Measures to implement the political provisions of the Minsk agreements
The sides express interest in agreeing within the Normandy format (N4) and the Trilateral Contact Group on all the legal aspects of the Special Order of Local Self-Government - special status - of Certain Areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions - as outlined in the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements from 2015 - in order to ensure its functioning on a permanent basis.
They consider it necessary to incorporate the “Steinmeier formula” into the Ukrainian legislation, in accordance with the version agreed upon within the N4 and the Trilateral Contact Group.
3. Follow up
They ask their Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Political Advisors to ensure the implementation of the agreements reached and they agree to have another meeting in this format within four months on the political and security conditions, inter alia for the organization of the local elections.
