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Tuesday 20 August 2019

What can Zelensky, Merkel, and Macron propose to Putin that will end his war with Ukraine?

As was to be expected, Victor Mallet and Henry Foy report that,

" Emmanuel Macron and Vladimir Putin have raised the possibility of a new round of negotiations to try to end the conflict in eastern Ukraine after five years of war.
...
“In close co-operation with President Zelensky and Chancellor [Angela] Merkel we will be considering the opportunity — it’s what we want — of a new summit in the Normandy format in the coming weeks if we can prepare the way,” Mr Macron said after welcoming Mr Putin." (Financial Times : 19 August 2019) (my emphasis)

But Macron is not having it all his own way.

Victor Mallet and Henry Foy continue that,

"The French president is risking criticism from human rights activists that he is welcoming Mr Putin at a time when the Russian government is persecuting its political opponents at home. But Mr Macron’s advisers say the aim is to make progress on Ukraine and other dangerous international conflicts in the run-up to the G7 summit of big democracies in Biarritz at the weekend." (ibid Mallet and Foy) (my emphasis)


Like Putin,

"Mr Macron also said he wanted to see the whole international order reshaped, hinting at an effort to bring Russia in from the cold in terms of its increasingly frosty relations with the west." (ibid Mallet and Foy) (my emphasis)

Holly Ellyatt (right) has, however, poured some cold water on the intentions of Macron. She argues that,

"However, no progress should be expected in resolving the Ukraine crisis - France does not have the diplomatic capital to get this process going on its own, and it is clear the so-called Normandy Format that also involves Germany is dead, with no meeting under its auspices in the last two years.” (CNBC : 19 August 2019) (my emphasis)

Holly Ellyatt further reports that,

"... Daragh McDowell, the principal Russia analysts at Eurasia Group, told CNBC on Monday.

“I wouldn’t envisage there will be any concessions on Ukraine at this point. I don’t think Putin will want to signal any readiness that he’s willing to back down. He doesn’t want to signal any weakness to Zelenksy.” (ibid Holly Ellyatt) (my emphasis)

It is also interesting to note that Daragh McDowell correctly identifies the 'Nord Steam 2 elephant in the room' of any "new summit in the Normandy format in the coming weeks”, as proposed by Macron, after he recently welcomed Mr Putin at the French presidential retreat of the Fort de Brégançon on the Mediterranean coast."  
 

Furthermore, as UNIAN reports,

" ... the meeting with Macron is evidence France is pursuing its own independent foreign policy, officials argue. Putin may see things differently, said Vladimir Frolov, a foreign-policy analyst in Moscow.
...
Putin is unlikely to agree to much on Ukraine, where the stalemate continues despite Zelensky's calls for a new push for peace, said Frolov." (UNIAN : 19 August 2019) (my emphasis)

Interestingly, Frolov also states that,

"Putin will be focusing on Trump in the dialogue with Macron, whom he looks down on as an upstart," Frolov said. "[..] Trump is more important [to Putin] than Macron." (ibid UNIAN above) (my emphasis)

And whilst Macron is trying to resuscitate a Normandy format meeting with Putin, UNIAN also reports that,

"Russia's hybrid military forces on August 19 mounted 11 attacks on Ukrainian Army positions in Donbas, eastern Ukraine, with one Ukrainian soldier reported as wounded in action.

"The armed forces of the Russian Federation and its mercenaries violated the ceasefire 11 times on August 19..." (UNIAN : 20 August 2019) (my emphasis)

Putin does, with impunity, command his Russian soldiers and proxies in the Donbas to consolidate his bargaining position by them simply walking roughshod over any ceasefire agreement.

Putin uses their attacks on Ukraine's soldiers as a political bargaining chip to essentially elicit concessions in his favour, concessions which are best exemplified by Macron,

"... hinting at an effort to bring Russia in from the cold in terms of its increasingly frosty relations with the west." (ibid Mallet and Foy) (my emphasis)

As Frolov so succinctly put it,

"It's a no-lose visit for Putin [to France], it completely eliminates the idea that he was isolated," said Frolov." (ibid UNIAN 19 August 2019) (my emphasis)

Ukraine's President Zelensky may be, like Macron, clamouring for a Normandy format meeting to try and end Putin's war with Ukraine and, with it, end those pesky EU sanctions against Putin and his 'siloviki' but, and it is a big BUT, will Putin ever agree to relinquishing his hold over the Donbas or returning Crimea back to Ukraine?

With this in mind, one can safely say that the Minsk2 protocols (see attached Appendix) are dead in the water.

So the question is,

"What will Zelensky, Macron, and Merkel propose at a new Normandy format meeting that will meet Putin's demands and end his war with Ukraine?"
(to be continued)

APPENDIX : MINSK2 PROTOCOLS

Full text of the Minsk2 agreement: (Wiki)

    1. Immediate and full ceasefire in particular districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine and its strict fulfilment  

        as of 00:00 midnight EET on 15 February 2015.

    2. Pull-out of all heavy weapons by both sides to equal distance with the aim of creation of a security zone on

        minimum 50  kilometres (31 mi) apart for artillery of 100mm calibre or more, and a security zone of 70
        kilometres (43 mi) for multiple rocket launchers (MRLS) and 140 kilometres (87 mi) for MLRS Tornado-S,
       Uragan, Smerch, and Tochka U tactical missile systems:
        for Ukrainian troops, from actual line of contact;
        for armed formations of particular districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine, from the contact line in

         accordance with the Minsk Memorandum as of 19 September 2014
        The pullout of the above-mentioned heavy weapons must start no later than the second day after the start of the

        ceasefire and finish within 14 days.
        This process will be assisted by OSCE with the support of the Trilateral Contact Group.

 
    3. Effective monitoring and verification of ceasefire regime and pullout of heavy weapons by OSCE will be provided

       from the first day of pullout, using all necessary technical means such as satellites, drones, radio-location systems etc.
    4. On the first day after the pullout a dialogue is to start on modalities of conducting local elections in accordance with

       the Ukrainian legislation and the Law of Ukraine "On temporary Order of Local Self-Governance in Particular Districts
       of  Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts," and also about the future of these districts based on the above-mentioned law.
       Without delays, but no later than 30 days from the date of signing of this document, a resolution has to be approved

        by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, indicating the territory which falls under the special regime in accordance with the
       law  "On temporary Order of Local Self-Governance in Particular Districts of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts," based in
       the line set up by the Minsk Memorandum as of 19 September 2014.
    5. Provide pardon and amnesty by way of enacting a law that forbids persecution and punishment of persons in relation

       to events that took place in particular districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine.
    6. Provide release and exchange of all hostages and illegally held persons, based on the principle of "all for all". This

        process has to end – at the latest – on the fifth day after the pullout (of weapons).
    7. Provide safe access, delivery, storage and distribution of humanitarian aid to the needy, based on an international

        mechanism.
    8. Define the modalities of a full restoration of social and economic connections, including social transfers, such as

        payments of pensions and other payments (income and revenue, timely payment of communal bills, restoration of tax
        payments within the framework of Ukrainian legal field).
        With this aim, Ukraine will restore management over the segment of its banking system in the districts affected by the

        conflict, and possibly, an international mechanism will be established to ease such transactions.

    9. Restore control of the state border to the Ukrainian government in the whole conflict zone, which has to start on

       the first day after the local election and end after the full political regulation (local elections in particular districts
       of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts based on the law of Ukraine and Constitutional reform) by the end of 2015, on
       the condition of fulfillment of Point 11 – in consultations and in agreement with representatives of particular
       districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts within the framework of the Trilateral Contact Group.

    10. Pullout of all foreign armed formations, military equipment, and also mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine

         under  OSCE supervision. Disarmament of all illegal groups.
 
    11. Constitutional reform in Ukraine, with a new constitution to come into effect by the end of 2015, the key element of

          which is decentralisation (taking into account peculiarities of particular districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts,
          agreed with representatives of these districts), and also approval of permanent legislation on the special status of
          particular districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in accordance with the measures spelt out in the attached
         footnote,[note 1] by the end of 2015.
    12. Based on the Law of Ukraine "On temporary Order of Local Self-Governance in Particular Districts of Donetsk and

          Luhansk Oblasts", questions related to local elections will be discussed and agreed upon with representatives of
         particular districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in the framework of the Trilateral Contact Group. Elections will be
         held in accordance with relevant OSCE standards and monitored by OSCE/ODIHR.
    13. Intensify the work of the Trilateral Contact Group including through the establishment of working groups on the

          implementation of relevant aspects of the Minsk agreements. They will reflect the composition of the Trilateral
         Contact Group.

 (The high-lighted points (2, 9, and 10) are what are now regarded by Merkel and Macron as mere aspirations)

Added to which, we have Putin showering the Donbas with Russian passports for the Ukrainian residents under the occupation of his Russian soldiers and rebel proxies.

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